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§01 · THE OPERATING MODELTALENTSERVICE.AI

MPS Verity · Agentic HR AI orchestrator & governor

Real people. Provable hires.

Orchestration moves the work. Governance decides who may act, on whose data, under which policy — and proves it afterwards to someone who does not have to trust us. The control plane is where your agents, your HR systems and your people meet: one place an agent is switched on or off, one broker every connected system is reached through, one append-only, hash-chained ledger of what was done, by whom, and under what authority — on EU infrastructure we run ourselves.

AN AGENT MAY PROPOSE ONLY A NAMED PERSON MAY DECIDE THE LEDGER SETTLES IT EU-RESIDENT · PROCESSORS PUBLISHED
The operating model · five gatesILLUSTRATIVE · NOT PRODUCTION DATA
PID ✓ DIPLOMA ✓ LIVENESS ✓ OVERRIDE LOG: rationale captured SOURCED IDENTITY VERIFIED STRUCTURED INTERVIEW HUMAN APPROVED EVIDENCE SEALED K. ████ Senior Backend · Budapest HIRED · EVIDENCE COMPLETE
EVIDENCE LOGAPPEND-ONLY · SHA-256
14:02:11 identity.verified gate:2/5 sha256 a3f7…9e21
14:02:19 interview.completed agent:proposed sha256 b81c…44d0
14:02:31 human.approved actor:named sha256 5d2e…c197
14:02:40 evidence.sealed gate:5/5 sha256 f04a…7b3d
14:02:41 chain.verify prev↔chain recomputed
AN MPS Verity PRODUCT PROTECTED BY DIGITAL ONE ENTERPRISE AI SUITE RiverAct SignWard SureWard
§02 · THE TRUTH PROBLEMTALENTSERVICE.AI

Hiring has a truth problem.

Remote hiring opened the door to global talent — and to synthetic candidates, proxy interviews, and deepfaked video calls. Screening tools were built to rank applicants, not to prove they exist.

1 in 4

candidate profiles projected fraudulent by 2028

GARTNER
6%

of candidates admit to interview fraud

GARTNER 2Q25, N=3,000
69%

of UK hiring leaders rank deepfake impersonation the top threat

FIRST ADVANTAGE
23%

of companies found identity fraud among new hires

CHECKR

Every interview is now an identity event. Every offer letter is a security decision.

§03 · THE CONTROL PLANETALENTSERVICE.AI

Orchestration moves the work. Governance decides who may act.

In eighteen months your organisation will be running agents from four different places: ones your ATS vendor shipped, ones your own team built, ones you bought, ones we provide. Each one wants a credential to the ATS and reach into candidate data. The default outcome is credential sprawl — and nobody in the building able to answer the only question that matters when something goes wrong: what did they do to this person, and who said they could?

WITHOUT A BROKER · N × M AGENTS HR SYSTEMS nine credentials to hold, revoke and explain WITH THE CONTROL PLANE · N + M CONTROL PLANE AGENTS HR SYSTEMS one credential store · one log · one off switch

Your agents are not connected to your systems. They are connected to the control plane, and the control plane is connected to the systems. That single indirection is the product. Everything else — the catalogue, the gates, the ledger — is what it makes possible.

Four planes, brokered.

SOUTH

The systems plane

An agent never holds a vendor credential. It may hold only a grant against the control plane — and the control plane holds the credential, decides every call, and refuses unless five independent conditions all positively hold: the global switch is on — checked first, before any database read, defaulting off — the organisation's connection row is active and holds a credential, the organisation accepted the current terms version, a usable credential resolves, and the organisation is inside its allowance. There is no default-allow path: an unknown provider, a missing row and an unreadable database all land on the same refusal.

NORTH

The agents plane

Every agent is a declared lane, not a script: which gate it serves, if any, which actions from the closed 25-action vocabulary it may write, and which act a named person must still perform beside it. Ten lanes are declared, eight of them bound to one of the five gates and two to none — the candidate’s own plane and the inbound door; a lane may write nothing that is not on its list, and nine actions may never be written by an agent lane at all. That is the vocabulary the system is built from, not a convention anyone can waive.

EAST / WEST

The people plane

Organisations bind by domain, resolved once per sign-in and stamped into the session; every organisation-scoped read and write passes through a single writer of the tenancy key, under row-level security that fails closed in both directions — no binding means zero rows out and inserts rejected. Candidates get their own narrow plane through purpose-bound links: the purpose is hashed into the token itself, so cross-use is structurally impossible rather than merely checked.

INBOUND

Your agents, talking to us

The direction most people miss. The broker faces both ways: outbound, nothing reaches your systems except on your authority; inbound, your own assistants and orchestrators may address us, so a compliance question may be put to the layer that holds the record instead of to yet another tool holding a token to your ATS. No inbound call may bypass a gate a human passes — no agent may inherit a human-only action by coming through a different door.

THE PART ENTERPRISES ACTUALLY BUY

Not the agents. The off switch — and there are two.

  • Yours. An organisation can disconnect every connector it has enabled, from its own screen, without a deploy and without touching data — and no agent may outlive the grant it stands on.
  • Ours. We can sever globally, with a switch that defaults off — so a host that forgot the variable is not authorised to make a single call.

In a category whose failure mode is “an autonomous thing did something to a person”, the switch is the product.

We do not compete for the system of record.

Software vendors sell tools. RPOs sell people. TalentService sells the surface they all have to meet on. Your ATS stays the system of record; no connector may write back into it, because the grant does not carry it.

Software vendors

Sell seats

You run the process, you carry the compliance. Fraud is your problem.

THE CONTROL PLANE

TalentService

Sells the control surface

One governed surface: every action authorised in one place, every decision taken by a named person, every step on a ledger a third party can recompute. Priced per verified hire.

AGENTS RECRUITERS EVIDENCE + +

Classic RPO

Sells hours

Human throughput, analog audit trail, AI bolted on.

Designed to run alongside your ATS and your existing RPO — TalentService layers authority, oversight and evidence on top. It replaces nothing.

Models commoditise. Agents commoditise. An ATS is sticky but replaceable. What does not migrate is an append-only history of who was permitted to do what to whom — and because it is append-only, no competitor can offer to import it and have it mean anything. Orchestration is the half every vendor will claim by 2027. Governance is the half that can only exist before the first row.

§04 · SIX PILLARSTALENTSERVICE.AI

The layer, pillar by pillar.

Connecting a system is not writing an API client. It is admitting a vendor into a governed estate — so the integration layer, the evidence layer and the human gate are one design, not three features.

§04.1

Multi-level integrations

“Multi-level” means four levels, kept as separate objects on purpose. The vendor level — what a system is, independent of any customer: legal seat, hosting region, EU-residency posture, where our requests would land, and how a credential is obtained. The organisation level — what you authorised: your credential, the terms version you accepted, your enablement row, your run history. The semantic level — one canonical hiring vocabulary every system maps into, so an auditor never has to learn one vendor’s noun for a stage. The inbound level — other people’s agents talking to us.

A connector factory, not a bespoke build.

VENDOR — what a system is ORGANISATION — what you authorised SEMANTIC — one hiring vocabulary INBOUND — other people’s agents BROKER
§04.2

The verified candidate layer

Identity is a gate, not a checkbox: the design admits no candidate on a claim nobody verified, and the actions the gate may write are fixed. The route is wallet-first — EUDI Wallet credentials for person identification data, diplomas and professional attestations — with a documented fallback path while member-state rollout completes, and a liveness route that does not depend on a wallet. Offers are designed to leave QES-signed.

Designed so you stop interviewing people who don’t exist.

WALLET PID ✓ DIPLOMA ✓ CREDENTIALS LIVENESS SEALED RAILS: SIGNWARD
§04.3

The evidence layer

Append-only is a database permission here, not an application promise: the role that writes evidence holds INSERT and SELECT, and UPDATE, DELETE and TRUNCATE were never granted, so rewriting history is impossible rather than forbidden. A stolen application credential still cannot rewrite it. Neither can we. Every event is appended and hash-chained: a SHA-256 hash of the canonical, key-sorted payload, then a chain hash over a domain-separated, length-prefixed preimage — so the encoding is injective and two different actor–action–subject triples can never share a preimage.

And the ledger has never held a person. It holds decisions and pointers to records. Subjects are opaque ids; no payload has ever carried a name or an email address — so a person’s right to erasure and the chain’s inability to forget never have to fight.

The proof is not a promise. It is a hash you can recompute.

EVENT 01 a3f7…9e21 EVENT 02 b81c…44d0 EVENT 03 5d2e…c197 EVENT 04 f04a…7b3d prev_hash prev_hash prev_hash RECOMPUTED INSERT + SELECT ONLY · NO UPDATE, NO DELETE RAILS: SUREWARD
§04.4

Human oversight, built in

Nine actions — advancing or returning a gate, approving, overriding, extending an offer, rejecting an application, assigning scrutiny, flagging fraud, attesting a contractual constraint — may only ever be written by a named person, and no agent lane may write one. That is not a setting an administrator can turn off, it is the vocabulary the system is built from; and the reason the person gives is hashed onto the chain beside the decision, so what is permanent is the basis, not merely the name. An agent may propose. Only a named person may decide. The ledger settles it.

Every decision has a human name and a recorded why.

AGENT HUMAN PROPOSAL rationale.txt DECISION APPROVED
§04.5

Pay transparency

The Pay Transparency Directive’s transposition deadline passed on 7 June 2026, so the obligation is landing on employers now. The design answers it as rules, not reports: no job ad leaves the building without the range the country requires, a salary-history question is refused before it is asked, and pay-gap analytics may only run over the same evidence chain as everything else — one arithmetic, one record, no separate report nobody can check.

Designed so no job ad leaves the building non-compliant.

JOB AD SENIOR BACKEND ENGINEER BUDAPEST · HYBRID €64–78k SALARY HISTORY?
§04.6

EU-resident — and we publish the list

Everything we store is in the EU: compute, database and artifact storage in AWS eu-central-1 (Frankfurt), with our identity provider self-hosted on that same infrastructure rather than rented from a third party. Every processor that can touch TalentService data is named in a register together with what it actually sees — we hand that over instead of promising it. Systems you connect stay wherever their vendor runs them, and each vendor’s record says where that is, so nothing is implied about a system we do not host.

A residency answer with a list behind it, not an adjective.

ES FR DE PL HU EU-CENTRAL-1 FRANKFURT PROCESSOR REGISTER PUBLISHED
§04.7 · THE SYSTEMS CATALOGUE

A system is known before it is reached.

Twenty-three HR systems, held to one standard: the vendor’s legal seat, where it stores customer data, where our requests would land, and how a customer obtains a credential. Every entry is browsable inside the product, on its own record.

  • 23HR systems held to one standard
  • 3axes per system — data residency · API host · credential access
  • 1canonical hiring vocabulary every system maps into — so an auditor never learns a vendor’s noun

EU-native systems come first — that is a strategy, not a queue. And no system may be reached at all until its record exists and your organisation has authorised it. The catalogue is a permission surface, not a promise.

§05 · Why this wins the AI ActTALENTSERVICE.AI

The obligations are already here. Governance is the half that has to exist before the first row.

Annex III of the AI Act covers systems used to recruit and select people. The narrow-task derogation in Art. 6(3) looks like an escape and is not — it closes wherever a system profiles a natural person, and evaluating a candidate’s claims against a role’s requirements is profiling. There is no route out for anyone who evaluates candidates with a model. So the question is not whether the obligations attach to serious hiring AI. It is who built for them before the first row, and who will retrofit.

AI Act Art. 5(1)(f): emotion inference at work prohibited 2 FEB 2025 ✓ 7 JUN 2026 ✓ Pay Transparency Directive — transposition deadline passed AI Act Art. 50: people must be told they’re talking to AI 2 AUG 2026 ✓ BY END 2026 EUDI Wallets available in all 27 member states

Annex III classifies recruitment AI as high-risk. We design to the obligation, not to the calendar — and the compliance work is due either way. Our clients inherit it built in, not as a scramble.

OBLIGATION → MECHANISM

Each obligation, and the mechanism that discharges it. Governance is what you do to authority — who may act, on whose data, under which policy, provable afterwards — which is why every row below is a rule rather than a feature.

  • AI Act Art. 12 + 19record-keeping; automatically generated logs retained A hash-chained, append-only ledger where “append-only” is a database grant, not a code path. It is recomputable from the rows alone by anyone holding them, and what comes back is a verdict and counts — never payloads.
  • AI Act Art. 14 + 26(2)human oversight assigned to competent persons Nine actions no machine may write. A named person decides through a signed single-use link, and the reason they give is hashed onto the chain beside the decision.
  • GDPR Art. 22(3)safeguards against solely automated decisions The same nine actions. Art. 22 does not mention AI, so a deterministic auto-reject is not exempt either — one mechanism covers both regimes.
  • AI Act Art. 15accuracy and robustness Closed vocabularies everywhere: 25 actions and no free text reaches the chain by construction, so inputs cannot drift into anything.
  • GDPR Art. 17 vs. record-keepingerase the person, keep the audit Content hashes on the chain, content in erasable side-stores. The content goes; the proof that something was recorded at a time stays. A ledger with a redaction button is a ledger with a tamper button. And the question mostly does not arise: the ledger has never held a person. You cannot un-log a person you have already logged, which is why we never logged one.
  • AI Act Art. 50(1)tell a person they are interacting with AI — in force since 2 Aug 2026 No step may put a person in front of a model without telling them. The notice is designed as a versioned, hashed artefact, so the record can carry which version that person saw.
  • AI Act Art. 5(1)(f)emotion inference in the workplace is prohibited — since 2 Feb 2025, at the top penalty tier Never build it. A structural prohibition written into the gate that authorises any model use — not a policy anyone can override.

You can add an audit log tomorrow. You cannot add yesterday’s. A log that was not append-only from the first row can never be made retroactively trustworthy — the whole value is that nobody, including us, could have changed it. Human oversight bolted on later is a UI convention; ours is a permission grant and a closed vocabulary. And your organisation is the deployer: Art. 26 duties are yours. The control plane is what discharges them, and the ledger is what you hand your auditor.

Sources: Reg. (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act) · Reg. (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2.0) · Directive (EU) 2023/970 (Pay Transparency).

Deployer non-compliance carries statutory maximums up to €15M or 3% of global annual turnover.

We do not claim certification. We show mechanism — see §11.

§06 · PLATFORMTALENTSERVICE.AI

Your hiring on one pane of glass. Your auditor’s too.

Your systems, your agents, your people and your evidence stream on a single surface — and one surface is all there is, so an auditor reads the same one you do. Below is the operating model drawn with illustrative data — the pipeline, the gates and the evidence stream, as the product presents them.

app.talentservice.ai ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCT MOCK · NOT PRODUCTION DATA
  • Pipeline
  • Candidates
  • Evidence
  • Integrations
  • Agents
  • Settings
AUDITOR VIEW READ-ONLY
Time to verified hire 11.2days illustrative
Identity pass rate 94.6% pid · liveness
Human-gated decisions 100% 9 human-only actions
Chain integrity OKverdict 0 broken links
Verify the chain Recomputed from the rows · verdict and counts, never payloads verdict: ok
SOURCED24
A. ████ Senior Backend · Budapest CV RECEIVED
M. █████ Data Engineer · Wien CV RECEIVED
D. ████ SRE · Remote EU REFERRAL
IDENTITY VERIFIED11
S. ██████ ML Engineer · Berlin PID ✓LIVENESS ✓
E. ████ Backend · Kraków PID ✓DIPLOMA ✓
J. █████ Platform Eng · Dublin PID ✓LIVENESS ✓
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW6
R. ████ Senior Backend · Budapest LIVENESS ✓ROUND 2/3
T. █████ Data Engineer · Wien AGENT PROPOSEDRUBRIC SCORED
HUMAN APPROVED3
L. ████ ML Engineer · Berlin AWAITING HUMAN REVIEW
N. █████ SRE · Remote EU AWAITING HUMAN REVIEW
P. ████ Backend · Kraków APPROVED ✓RATIONALE LOGGED
EVIDENCE SEALED2
K. ████ Senior Backend · Budapest SEALED ✓CHAIN 7fc1…03aa
V. █████ QA Lead · Praha SEALED ✓EVIDENCE COMPLETE
EVIDENCE LOG DEMO
  • 14:02:11identity.verified sha256 a3f7…9e21
  • 14:02:04cv.validated sha256 b81c…44d0
  • 14:01:56consent.recorded sha256 5d2e…c197
  • 14:01:41interview.completed sha256 f04a…7b3d
  • 14:01:22scrutiny.assigned sha256 c9d1…5e08
  • 14:00:58human.overridden sha256 7fc1…03aa
  • 14:00:37evidence.sealed sha256 e2b8…61f4
CHAIN VERIFY VERDICT ONLY
RECOMPUTED FROM THE ROWS · NO PAYLOADS
§07 · PROCESS INTELLIGENCETALENTSERVICE.AI

The log proves the process. It can also explain it.

Every entry in the evidence chain is a timestamped, attributable fact about how your hiring actually runs. Process intelligence is designed the way everything else here is designed — by what it may do and what it may never do. Those are the rules below.

AN AGENT MAY PROPOSE ONLY A NAMED PERSON MAY DECIDE EVERY STEP ON THE CHAIN
§07.1

Responsiveness analytics

Response time may be aggregated per stage for every party in the process — client, recruiter, candidate — with deterministic timestamp arithmetic over the evidence chain, and no model infers anything here. Aggregates are the default, and an individual-level view may only be opened under documented client governance. Candidate response speed never feeds candidate evaluation.

§07.2

State reconciliation

When the record and reality drift — the interview happened, the gate never ticked — a correction may be proposed and only a named person may confirm it. Inferred and attested provenance are first-class on the log, so it always shows which facts a machine suggested and which a person stood behind. A suggestion may never commit itself.

§07.3

Candidate status portal

A candidate may see the state of their own application and nothing else — a narrow plane of their own, reached through a purpose-bound link with the purpose hashed into the token itself, so cross-use is structurally impossible rather than merely checked. Statuses never assert unverified state as fact: what a machine inferred stays labelled as inferred until a person attests it.

§07.4

Candidate feedback loop

A closed, clearly-scoped channel: a candidate may rate interview rounds so the client can improve its process. Participation is optional, and feedback may never reach the candidate’s own outcome — the form says so, and it states exactly who sees it.

§07.5

CV consistency checks & fraud triage

A mismatch between CV, job description and recruiter notes may be surfaced per claim, each discrepancy citing its sources — no single opaque score exists, by design — and nothing touches the pipeline without a named person’s attestation: decision support, never auto-reject. A fraud flag is one of the nine actions no machine may write, and it may only rest on objective signals that the record names.

§07.6

Contract-compliance guardrails

Where a lawful no-hire or non-solicitation obligation exists, the platform polices the client’s contract — never a wish list. A constraint may activate only after the client attests its specific contractual basis into the evidence log; free-text blocklists are refused by design. Matches surface for human review with a transparent category of reason, and every constraint expires with its contract.

§07.7

Verification depth — assurance tiers

Verification depth may be set per role and per stage: deeper identity and document checks where the role warrants them. Tiers attach to the process, not to the person. An escalation may only follow an objective, documented signal — a failed document check, not a hunch — and it is approved by a named person and logged.

app.talentservice.ai ILLUSTRATIVE PRODUCT MOCK · NOT PRODUCTION DATA
STATE RECONCILIATION · REVIEW QUEUE PROPOSE → CONFIRM · APPEND-ONLY · SHA-256 interview.completed — gate never ticked INFERRED PROPOSED · AWAITING HUMAN interview.scheduled — slot elapsed, nothing recorded INFERRED PROPOSED · AWAITING HUMAN gate.advanced — provenance: inferred-confirmed ATTESTED · O. ████ ✓ ON CHAIN · sha256 5d2e…c197 SUGGESTIONS NEVER AUTO-COMMIT — A NAMED HUMAN CONFIRMS; INFERRED AND ATTESTED BOTH LAND ON THE CHAIN

Documentation of human-led rounds — timestamps, participants, notes — belongs in the evidence chain as documentation and nothing more. No documentation record may stand in for a decision, and nothing in this section is an interviewer.

§08 · AGENTS & APITALENTSERVICE.AI

Talk to it. Or let your agents do the talking.

The broker faces both ways. Outbound, nothing reaches your systems except on your authority. Inbound is the direction most people miss: your own assistants and orchestrators may address the control plane instead of being handed yet another token to your ATS — so a compliance question may be put to the layer that holds the record. Whatever protocol an agent arrives on — MCP, which any MCP-compatible assistant speaks, or REST for everything else — it must be authorised in the same place, by the same rules, as a person at a screen: one vocabulary, whichever door. No inbound call may bypass a gate a human passes, and no agent may inherit a human-only action by coming through a different door. Below is the shape such a call must take — what it must carry, and what it may ask for — rather than an address.

INTERFACE SHAPE
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "talentservice": {
      "url": "<control-plane MCP endpoint>",
      "auth": "oauth",
      "description": "Open roles, verified shortlists, chain verification"
    }
  }
}
WHAT AN INBOUND CALL MAY ASK FOR
roles.open shortlist.review chain.verify

A machine action lands on the record with the identity that took it, or it does not land at all. An agent never holds a vendor credential — it may hold only a grant against the control plane. No call may be made that the control plane did not decide, and none may be made that it did not record — whichever door it came through. Coming through the API does not widen what an agent may do; it only changes the door.

§09 · PRICINGTALENTSERVICE.AI

Pay for hires, not seats.

No seats, no licences. You pay when a verified hire walks through the door — with the record that proves how it got there.

Pilot

Fixed fee · 2 roles · 60 days

  • The full control surface — systems, agents, people
  • Hash-chained evidence from the first event
  • Success criteria agreed up front
Talk to us
RECOMMENDED

Scale

Per verified hire + compliance SLA

  • Every system you connect, brokered and metered under one allowance
  • Named human gate on every decision
  • Chain verification on demand
Talk to us

Sovereign

Dedicated deployment

  • Dedicated EU-cloud deployment
  • Your own systems brokered through the same control plane
  • Works-council consultation pack for DE/AT/NL rollouts
Talk to us

How pricing works

Pilot is a fixed fee — two roles, 60 days, success criteria agreed up front. Scale is priced per verified hire. Sovereign is scoped per deployment. What moves a per-hire price: role seniority, hiring volume, and verification depth. Model your own exposure →

Every tier runs on the same substrate: the same hash-chained ledger, the same nine human-only actions, the same EU-resident infrastructure, and the same ledger that has never held a person. The operating model runs five gates — sourced, identity verified, structured interview, human approved, evidence sealed — and which gates a pilot runs, which stay yours, and the contractual billing definition are agreed with each client before it starts.

When TalentService isn’t the right fit

  • You are shopping for a system of record — you want an ATS, and we deliberately are not one.
  • You optimize for the cheapest cost per CV at maximum volume — we price verified hires, not throughput.
  • You have no EU regulatory exposure and no identity-fraud concern in your funnel.
  • You hire a handful of people a year and want zero change to your process.

If that is you, the honest recommendation is a Pilot at most — or nothing. We would rather say so now than after kickoff.

§11 · Procurement FAQTALENTSERVICE.AI

The questions procurement asks. Answered straight.

What is TalentService?

The agentic HR AI orchestrator and governor. Orchestration moves the work; governance decides who may act, on whose data, under which policy — and proves it afterwards to someone who does not have to trust us. Architecturally it is a control plane. Every organisation is about to run agents — ones they buy, ones they build, ones their ATS ships, ones we provide — against the most regulated data they hold. TalentService is the layer where those agents, the systems of record they read from, and the people who stay accountable meet on one surface: one place where an agent is switched on or off per organisation, one broker through which every connected system is reached, and one append-only, hash-chained ledger where every action lands the moment it happens. Your ATS stays the system of record. We become the record of what was done, by whom, and under what authority.

Does TalentService replace our ATS or RPO?

No, and it is not designed to. We do not compete for the system of record — we are the layer above it. Your ATS keeps the requisitions and applications, your RPO or internal team keeps its workflow, and TalentService adds the control surface: which agents may act, which systems they may reach, which decisions only a named person may take, and the evidence trail underneath all of it.

How do agents get access to our HR systems?

They do not. An agent never holds a vendor credential — it may hold only a grant against the control plane, and the control plane holds the credential. Credentials live in one encrypted per-organisation store, and nothing reaches an outside system unless five independent conditions all positively hold: the global switch is on, your connection row is active and holds a credential, your organisation has accepted the current terms version, a usable credential resolves, and you are within your allowance. There is no default-allow path — an unknown provider, a missing row and an unreadable database all land on the same refusal.

Which systems do you integrate with?

Twenty-three HR systems are held to the same standard before anything is connected to them: the vendor’s legal seat, where it stores customer data, where our requests would land, and how a customer obtains a credential. Every entry is browsable inside the product, on its own record. EU-native systems come first — that is a strategy, not a queue. And no system may be reached at all until its record exists and your organisation has authorised it, so the catalogue is a permission surface rather than a promise.

Where does our data live?

On EU infrastructure we run ourselves: AWS eu-central-1 (Frankfurt) for compute, database and artifact storage, with the identity provider self-hosted on that same infrastructure rather than rented from a third party. Every processor that can touch TalentService data is named in our processor register together with what it actually sees, and we hand that register over rather than promising one. Systems you connect stay wherever their vendor runs them — each vendor’s record in our catalogue states where that is, so nothing is implied about a system we do not host.

How does the evidence log work?

Every event is appended to a hash-chained ledger, and append-only is a database permission rather than an application promise: the writing role holds INSERT and SELECT only — UPDATE, DELETE and TRUNCATE were never granted, so they are impossible rather than forbidden — and the application role holds SELECT alone. Each row carries a SHA-256 hash of its canonical payload plus a chain hash over a domain-separated, length-prefixed preimage, so any alteration breaks the chain and the whole history recomputes from the rows alone. Verification returns a verdict and counts, never payloads. A stolen application credential still cannot rewrite history. Neither can we.

Does the evidence log hold our candidates’ personal data?

No. The ledger has never held a person. It holds decisions and pointers to records: subjects are opaque ids, and no payload has ever carried a name or an email address. Most products that prove they governed a person do it by logging the person — and having logged them once, they cannot un-log them. Content hashes go on the chain; the content itself lives in erasable side-stores. So a person’s right to erasure and the chain’s inability to forget never have to fight.

Who decides — the agent or a person?

A person. Nine actions — advancing or returning a gate, approving, overriding, extending an offer, rejecting an application, assigning scrutiny, flagging fraud and attesting a contractual constraint — may only ever be written by a named person, and no agent lane may write one. That is not a setting an administrator can turn off; it is the vocabulary the system is built from. And the reason the person gives is hashed onto the chain beside the decision, so what is permanent is the basis, not merely the name.

Is TalentService ready for the EU AI Act?

Annex III classifies systems used to recruit and select people as high-risk, and the narrow-task derogation in Article 6(3) closes wherever a system profiles a natural person — which evaluating a candidate against a role’s requirements does. So we design to the obligation, not to the calendar. Record-keeping under Articles 12 and 19 is the hash-chained append-only ledger. Human oversight under Articles 14 and 26 is the nine human-only actions. Accuracy and robustness under Article 15 is a closed 25-action vocabulary with no free text reaching the chain. Article 50 has applied since 2 August 2026: no step may put a person in front of an AI system without telling them, and the notice a person is shown is designed as a versioned, hashed artefact, so the record can carry which version they saw. Emotion inference in the workplace has been prohibited since 2 February 2025 at the top penalty tier; we will not build it.

Are you certified?

We are not yet certified, and we do not wear compliance as a badge. What we offer instead is mechanism you can inspect: the grants on the database, the closed action vocabulary, the tenancy policies that fail closed in both directions, and the processor register.

What about EUDI Wallet timing?

Under Reg. (EU) 2024/1183, member states are to make EUDI Wallets available by the end of 2026. The TalentService identity gate is designed wallet-first, with a documented fallback route that does not depend on a wallet, so no candidate is stranded by a member state’s timetable. The actions the gate may write are fixed, and the design admits no candidate on a claim nobody verified.

What counts as a verified hire?

The operating model runs five gates — sourced, identity verified, structured interview, human approved, evidence sealed — and a hire is verified when it has passed all five with the record to show it. Which gates a pilot runs, which are ours and which stay yours, and the contractual billing definition, are agreed with each client before the pilot starts.

We hire fewer than 20 people a year — is this for us?

Yes — the Pilot tier is designed for exactly this: two roles, 60 days, fixed fee, and success criteria agreed up front. You get the same control surface and the same evidence trail as a high-volume client, without committing to a volume model.

§12 · Book a pilot TALENTSERVICE.AI

Hire like it’s on the record. Because now it is.

Start with a pilot: 2 roles, 60 days, fixed fee — the full control surface, hash-chained evidence from the first event, success criteria agreed up front. Partners and platform teams: ask for the architecture walkthrough instead.

AN AGENT MAY PROPOSE ONLY A NAMED PERSON MAY DECIDE THE LEDGER SETTLES IT